PMZ Campaign: Orleans 3

Report from General Obstfelder,
commanding First Army
The third battle for Orleans, dated December 24th 1944

General Knobelsdorff has been out of communication since his command centre was overrun on 17th December. Information on the battle is sketchy but it appears he deployed on a ridgeline with armour and infantry spread out along the front overlooking open ground. He had no heavy tanks available, but they were supported by two companies of Jg Pz4s.

The Americans attacked in mass and, while their lead units were forced back by accurate fire, the American airforce pounded our positions in great numbers, disrupting our front elements. Taking advantage of this, the Americans pushed forward with their second line and overran our forward positions, causing units all along the line to fall back. The Volkssturm units proved particularly unreliable.

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The view from behind the German positions. In the foreground, the German units are withdrawing, badly damaged. The American airforce are bombing the remaing units on the ridge while their troops at the rear are poised to break through.

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The Americans then committed their final reserve which punched though our line, overrunning the command centre and opening a wide corridor though our lines, precipitating the entire Korps to retreat. This in turn caused the First Army to withdraw to the river Seine.

I have been placed in command of First Army and am fortifying positions along the banks of the Seine with those units I have remaining.

PMZ Campaign: Soviet report

Ставка Главного Командования
Вооруженных Сил Союза ССР
STAVKA REPORT
Byelorussian Strategic Offensive
Report by Marshal Zhukov

The liberation of Byelorussia comprised three battles. Of particular significance was the preparatory phase during which we were able to draw off key defending units and mislead the enemy as to our intentions. By varying the strategic point of attack we were able to have the defenders misplace key units and enhance the value of our own attack units.

In the Battle of Bobruisk we faced a difficult initial combat to break into the enemy defences that were well anchored on hills and a lake while being fronted by wooded areas. Our tactical approach was to use tank formations on the clearer flanking areas and infantry assault teams in the central woods. The disadvantage was that we lost the option of synergy in mixing the combat arms and in general the approaches to the defences were too constricted by the choices made in developing our attack. Nevertheless, when able to close with the enemy we were able to overwhelm them and achieve a break-in. Particular note should be made of the efforts of the assault engineers who were highly successful in penetrating the enemy’s position. However, too much was asked of infantry that should be used to hold the ground seized and not enough use was made of the Tank Corps to fulfil the primary mission of taking objectives. From north to south the deployment was 9 Tank Corps, 18 Rifle Corps, 41 Rifle Corps, 130 Rifle Corps, 16 Tank Corps and 11 Tank Corps. However, the Rifle Corps entered combat sequentially making it easier for the defender to fend off our blows. Only in the north on the right flank did we have some success with 18 Rifle Corps and 9 Tank Corps making a coordinated attack. The key to this proved to be the attachment of the assault engineers with flamethrower tanks to 18 Rifle Corps and the use of follow-up units behind the main attack of both 18 Rifle Corps and 9 Tank Corps that could prevent successful counter-attacks. In classic military style the commitment of the final reserve could not be countered by the enemy who had been forced to commit all already. The northern wing troops were eventually able to prise open the defences and force the enemy opposing them to retire and that then caused the Hitlerite army to retreat for 125 kilometres. During this retreat the enemy was forced to abandon much equipment and as a result we have obtained examples of his most recent anti-tank guns and tank destroyers. These could be seen to be formidable developments as shown by his capacity to hold off our left flank attack with a single group of tank destroyers that were able to disable our tanks at extreme range.

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The break-in arising from the first battle then led to the Battle of Minsk. On this occasion the terrain was advantageous to us in being mainly clear with a wood and hills on the right, a village on the left and woods in the enemy’s flanking rear areas. This gave us the opportunity to develop a broad attack with each unit being able to readily support neighbouring units and enabled extensive firepower to be deployed as enemy positions were uncovered, quickly bringing suppressive fire down to disrupt his positions. Deployment from north to south was 18 Rifle Corps and 16 Tank Corps to assault the woods and hills on the right, 11 Tank Corps in the centre, 9 Tank Corps and 130 Rifle Corps on the left to seize the village and advance along the line of communications. Each tank corps was reinforced with an attached heavy-weapon gun regiment and this proved a successful tactic.

Extensive use was made of reconnaissance troops to identify enemy strong points prior to engagement. Rapid engagement of identified targets ensured quick suppression of the enemy positions and as a result reduced our own casualties. At this battle the enemy fielded for the first time his new heavy tank, which was immediately and successful engaged by the available SU85s. Particular mention should be made of the pilots of 16 Air Army supporting the attack whose ground attacks were prompt and accurate, ensuring that the enemy unit was not merely neutralised but destroyed. An unfortunate by-product was the lack of working models to examine. The debris showed thick armour and a powerful gun but a lack of engine power. That it is a potent weapon is shown by the damage inflicted on 11 Tank Corps, which took considerable casualties in the fire-fight with the main enemy defence line while engaging these new tanks. Our troops were able to cause rapid and significant damage on the enemy and most of his tanks were rendered inoperable early in the engagement. His forces hung grimly on suffering ever greater casualties until on the left flank and centre they broke in rout. On our right flank the terrain had slowed the approach to combat so his forces held there a little longer before fleeing. In handling the attack the unit commanders showed they were learning from their experiences in dealing with enemy forces. In the pursuit our right flank was able to overrun the enemy command complex, the centre to capture his forward supply depot and the left flank to advance onto his line of communications. With the Hitlerite army in flight we were able to capture extensive amounts of personnel and equipment, reducing his deployable forces for subsequent engagements and requiring him to draw extensively from reserves to reequip his forces. The pursuit also allowed the considerable unopposed advance of 375 kilometres.

Analysis of the correlation of forces at this point showed a continuation of combat to be unwise. In June we had the advantage of 2:1 in personnel and 3:1 in tanks. The intelligence assessment of our available forces at this point, compared to the enemy forces available at the new defence line under construction, suggested the position was 1.4:1 in personnel and 1.6:1 in tanks. Given that the Hitlerites would field more effective tanks than previously I considered it prudent to pause to rebuild strength, despite the fact that this would enable him to improve his defences. I suspected that in any future engagement the enemy would seek to field higher quality tanks in greater numbers and to cope with this I needed the full strength allocated to me by STAVKA available for battle. We had advanced 500 kilometres, one-third of the way to Berlin, and needed time to bring supplies forward and add replacements to our depleted ranks.
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The third and final battle in the offensive was the Battle of Brest-Litovsk. The terrain at this point proved most difficult as the route required us to pass between two woods, bounded by a lake and covered by a hill that had to be crossed. The wide open nature of the terrain allowed the employment of a mass tank attack but also permitted the Hitlerites a wide expanse to fire from longer range on attacking forces. Deployment from north to south was 41 Rifle Corps and 16 Tank Corps to assault the woods on the right, 11 Tank Corps in the centre to assault the hill complex, 9 Tank Corps and 130 Rifle Corps on the left to seize the woods and open a communication axis into the enemy rear area and advance along the line of communications. Each tank corps was reinforced with attached heavy-weapon units.

At an early stage in the advance the assault began to break-up under the intense fire of the enemy tanks and tank destroyers. Once again the main success against the heavy units of the enemy was achieved by aircraft. Extensive reconnaissance overwhelmed enemy scouting parties to identify the main lines of resistance. Valiant assaults by our troops closed on the enemy and began to break into his positions. On the left flank tank units broke through into his rear areas and threatened to overrun his command centre. In the centre an extensive and prolonged fight between the enemy units defending the hill area and the 11 Tank Corps developed. On the right flank our attacking troops closed with the enemy and forced him out of the wooded area, the advancing troops taking part of the hill defences and reaching close to his forward supply centre. Both the defending flanks were successfully taken and much credit must be taken by the Commissars in maintaining the fighting morale of the units in difficult circumstances, rally troops to further efforts by their exhortations. In the centre the enemy held grimly on to the main hill-line and the woods at the base of it. Intense anti-aircraft defences based on the hill and enemy fighter cover over the battlefield significantly reduced the impact of our air support units. Despite the utmost endeavours of the tanks and infantry who continued their assault until exhausted it proved impossible to shift the enemy from his positions. This prevented the proper exploitation of the successes we had achieved and our forces therefore commenced an orderly withdrawal to their start lines. A large percentage of the enemy had fled the battlefield but the Hitlerites retained sufficient strength to deny the Red Army its well deserved victory. Good tactical skill was once again shown by our commanders in their use of combined arms. However, it was clear that our tank attacks lacked sufficient power and an upgrade in this arm was needed before the next advance could be made. The enemy’s infantry had suffered many casualties and showed evidence of degraded performance but the tank arm still showed much determination.

At this point it was appropriate to close down the Strategic Offensive and commence the Memel-Baltic Offensive with the Second Byelorussian Front. The resource base available to us at this point was such that we could vary the strategic approach by closing exhausted offensives and opening new offensives simultaneously, causing the enemy considerable difficulties. The Hitlerites had been forced to switch forces between fronts and thereby added wear and tear to men and equipment while being able to deploy them less frequently operationally. During the Byelorussian Strategic Offensive the enemy suffered casualties equal to more than 100% of his personnel and 70% of his equipment, while being driven back 500 kilometers. In compliance with instructions First Byelorussian Front had covered one-third of the distance to Berlin.

Georgi Zhukov
Marshall of Soviet Armies

PMZ Campaign: Antwerp

Report from General Dietrich,
commanding Sixth Panzer Army
The second battle for Antwerp, dated November 20th 1944

As part of operation Autumn Mist, I had been given the task of driving the British back and siezing the port of Antwerp, thus depriving the Allies of their supply base. My orders were to drive as rapidly as possible for the port before the poor weather cleared which would allow the Allied airforce to operate. The British were occupying polder country so I was forced to attack on a narrow front in one of the clear corridors dominated by a line of low hills.

I attacked on the right with the 10th SS Pz Division supported by the 30th SS Inf Division, a Tiger Pz Abteilung and Jg Panthers. On the left the 9th Panzer Division was to make a diversionary attack supported by the 26th Infantry Division. The attack got off to a slow start as the Panthers and Tigers were forced to negotiate forested ground. Emerging from the forest they came under heavy fire from Shermans and antitank guns on the ridge in front of them and took significant casualties as they closed. After considerable manoeuvring, the British gave way and retired behind the hills.

On the left the 9th Panzer swung away from the wooded ground in front of them and advanced on the central ridge. They came under heavy fire from the ridge and forced to stop. At this point they were attacked in the flank by a battalion of Churchills hidden in the wooded ground and forced to retreat. Despite repeated attacks, they could make no further headway. Short on fuel, they retired from the battlefield.

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The view from behind the left flank. The lead elements of 9th Panzer are advancing on the central ridge. In the background 10th SS Pz have driven the British from the ridge.

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The 10th SS Pz advanced up onto the ridge and found themselves facing another British division which had moved up behind it. Another lengthy battle ensued, using up more precious fuel. Eventually the British were forced to retire, leaving the 10th SS Pz in possession of the ridgeline. With intact Britsh troops on the flanking hill, two British divisions in front and very little fuel, I knew it was now impossible to capture Antwerp and so was forced to call off the attack.

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The view from behind the German positions. 10th SS Pz have advanced onto the ridge. The British are in front of them and on the central hill.

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PMZ Campaign: Orleans 2

Report from General Knobelsdorff,
commanding First Army
The second battle for Orleans, dated October 20th 1944

Since the capture of General Eberbach at the beginning of September I have commanded First Army. Knowing it was just a matter of time before the Americans attacked once more, I chose a good defensive position and dug in as best I could with the limited resources at hand. My left flank was covered by impassable terrain, next was high ground with a good field of fire. In the centre the ground was lightly wooded with forest to the rear. The open right flank I protected with minefields and other obstacles. Prior to the attack, I learnt that American paratroops had dropped at Troyes and seized the bridges over the Seine, so I knew I had to stop the American attacks at all costs so the bridges could be recaptured.

The opening American artillery barrage was directed at the recently vacated front positions and so caused no casualties. The opening attack was made by the newly arrived American 14th Armoured division supported by infantry in the centre. Here I had placed the veteran 189th infantry division supported by a Panther battalion of the 2nd Panzer division. These troops stood their ground despite repeated attacks and caused huge casualties on the American units.

The American airforce was largely absent, only one attack being made which missed its target.

The American 4th Armoured division attacked against the high ground defended by the untested 18th Luftwaffe division. Taken in flank by the Panthers, it ground to a halt, only one unsupported battalion of shermans making it through the Luftwaffe positions, however this did present a threat to our rear areas.

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The view from behind the German positions. On the left the shermans have broken through Luftwaffe positions on the high ground. In the wooded ground in the centre, the 189th Inf are holding off the Americans while a spotter plane flies overhead.

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The American 5th Infantry division advanced on the right but stopped short of the minefields. 2nd Panzer was stationed on this flank but facing no attack sent a battalion to aid the threatened rear areas. However this proved unnecessary as the Luftwaffe division, displaying unexpected resilience, counter attacked the Shermans which eventually retired.

As usual, facing huge losses, the American command ordered a withdrawal. I await the next attack. The paratroops of the American First Airbourne Army have been defeated.

PMZ Campaign: Eindhoven 1

Report from General Student,
commanding First Parachute Army
The battle for Eindhoven, dated October 23rd 1944

A month of inactivity by the British has allowed me to regroup my forces and dig in along the 'West Wall'.

The British attacked in mid October. At this position I had deployed the 16th Luftwaffe Division supported by Jg Panzer IVs in wooded ground on the left. In the centre the 422nd Infantry Division (with an attached Panther battalion) was dug-in around a village within wooded ground through which ran the main highway. On the right was the newly arrived 101st Pz Brigade in an area of polders.

The attack began with an AGRA shoot against the central wooded area. Fortunately this caused little damage, the 422nd Division quickly re-establishing its positions. This was followed by an attack of three infantry divisions against the central village and the polders. The British found the polders difficult to traverse and soon came under accurate fire from the 101st Pz Brigade, so this attack ground to a halt, the British infantry retiring to cover. The few fighter aircaft remaining to the Luftwaffe now made an appearance and shot down many allied aircraft; they didn't bother us again for the remainder of the battle.

The British infantry in the centre was having more success, one battalion from 422nd Division being destroyed. At this point the attack on the polders by the central British division was redirected towards the village and two armoured divisions committed to the attack. In response, the Panther battalion in the centre moved forward and attacked one of these divisions in the flank destroying many Sherman tanks. Its mission accomplished, it then withdrew behind the village. The second armoured division struggled through the polders against the Panthers of 101st Pz Brigade. As they advanced the Panzers retired, continually inflicting losses.

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The view from behind the British positions. On the right 422nd Inf are holding the village, the Panthers having retired behind them, the British infantry are engaging them. The 101st Pz Brigade are behind the Polders on the far left. The British infantry have just been stopped.

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At this point with losses mounting and the German fire unabated, the British command realised they were not going to break through our positions, so they abandoned the attack. I ancicipate they will soon be back.

PMZ Campaign: Brest Litovsk 1

Report from General Balck,
commanding Fourth Panzer Army
The battle for Brest Litovsk, dated Sept 23rd 1944

Following the disaster at Minsk, I have replaced General Nehring. August was quiet on this front, the Soviets presumed to be reorganising after outrunning their supply in their advance to Bialystock. There has been a major uprising in Warsaw which resulted in all my replacements being diverted to crush this, however it is being successfully suppressed.

Expecting a massive Soviet attack, my forces were deployed between a lake on the left and open woods on the right. The critical forward wooded area was held by the 275th infantry division with attached Jagd Panthers. The 16th Panzer division was deployed on the high ground in the centre with some of its Panthers deployed with the 72nd infantry division in the woods on the right, this division also had a company of Jagd Panthers attached. Minefields protected the flanks although most of them were ineffective due to lack of material.

The Soviet attack began with a massive katyusha bombardment which disrupted two thirds of my units, however our morale held. The attack was concentrated in the centre. Six Soviet divisions attacked in line, their infantry and tanks quickly entering the important forward woods. The tanks in the centre advanced cautiously and were soon stopped by the Panthers of 16th Pz Division. A long range firefight then developed with the Panthers easily outgunning the T34s, only the JSIIs could engage them effectively. The small groups of ISU152s and SU85s proved to be ineffective in this situation.

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The view from behind the German positions. 275th Inf are dug in, in the woods on the left , with the infantry of 16th Panzer behind them. The Panthers are on the hills in the foreground firing on the mass of advancing Soviet tanks. The 72nd Inf are on the right laying down fire on the advancing Soviet infantry.
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The Soviet airforce attacked in strength but their Sturmoviks were held in check by the small number of Messerschmits we had available.

Soviet infantry on the right were stopped by the 72nd infantry and soon forced to withdraw under heavy fire. The Soviet armour on the right then attacked the 72nd who gave way under the pressure and retreated. This Soviet armour was then attacked in turn by the 16th Pz Division and itself forced to retreat. At this point the 275th infantry broke and retreated from the forward woods which were now held by only a single infantry unit of 16th Panzer, the only remaining German division. This unit hung on tenaciously despite repeated Soviet attacks.

The Panthers eventually won the firefight in the centre and the Soviet tank divisions retreated. With no Soviet units on the right and centre, the 16th Pz Division now counter-attacked into the forward woods, driving back the now exhausted Soviet units. At this point the Soviet command abandoned its attack and their remaining units precipitously retreated, leaving hundreds of T34s behind. I do not anticipate another Soviet attack for some time and so can concentrate on rebuilding my units.

Generalleutnant Dietrich von Müller, the commander of 16th Pz Division has been awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves for his outstanding performance in this battle.

PMZ Campaign: Amiens 2

Report from General Student,
commanding First Parachute Army
The second battle for Amiens, dated September 5th 1944

This report is based on confused evidence pieced together over the past few days.

General Eberbach prepared to stop the expected British attack by deploying the PzIVs of Panzer Lehr division on high ground supported by the Tiger IIs of Panzer-Abteilung 501. On the left he placed the 422nd Infantry Division, resting its left flank on marshy ground with a lake beyond it. The 716th Infantry Division was in reserve protecting the command centre and supply base amidst light woods. To the right of Panzer Lehr was open ground.

The British attacked aggressively with three armoured and infantry divisions in the centre. Panzer Lehr fought valiantly, the Tiger IIs causing one of the attacking divisions to precipitously retreat. On the left, a division of mixed tanks and infantry attacked the 422nd Division, which held on determinedly. Meanwhile the British 7th Armoured division swung wide round the right flank. The British attack faltered at this first setback and they appeared to doubt the possibility of breaking through our position.
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The view from behind the German positions. Panzer Lehr are on the high ground under heavy attack. 422nd are in the marshy ground to the left. In the foreground the 7th Armoured are advancing with the remnants (Pv IVs) of 716th retreating before them.

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Then a battalion of Churchill tanks reached the hill and together with the remaining troops broke into the Panzer Lehr positions. On the left, the British succeeded in pushing the 422nd Division back into the woods. On the right the 7th Armoured turned and smashed into the flank of 716th Division which disintegrated, allowing the command and supply bases to be overrun, General Eberbach being captured along with most of his staff. Being almost surrounded, Panzer Lehr broke at last and retreated from the field. With no effective command, the entire corps now broke and retreated back towards the Scheldt.

I was commanding the Fallschirmjaeger regiments guarding the Scheldt, these were the first elements of First Parachute Army. At this time units of the British First Airborne Army dropped on Antwerp and seized the bridges over the river.

Fifth Panzer Army now split in two, with half facing the Americans and the remainder being pursued by the British. The British armour drove rapidly for the Scheldt, German resistance crumbling in front of them, and they managed to reach the bridges before my troops could crush the First Airborne Army. However I have now contained the British within the Antwerp area.